When Viktor Orbán returned to power in 2010, his government made family support a central part of its political message and launched an ambitious pronatalist program. Young married heterosexual couples in formal jobs could receive interest-free loans, mortgage subsidies, tax breaks, and payments tied to promises of future children, along with support for a larger car or home renovation. For a time, the results looked encouraging: Hungary’s fertility rate rose from 1.25 in 2010 to 1.59 in 2020. By 2025, however, it had slipped to 1.31.
That rise and fall has divided observers. Some argue the measures prevented an even sharper decline in a country that also faces emigration and low immigration. Others say the policy mainly brought forward births that would have happened anyway, or that broader regional trends explain much of the change. There are also questions about how evenly the benefits were felt, since the money went further in some places than in others.
The debate has implications beyond Hungary. South Korea has spent more than £215bn on family support without reversing its decline, while Sweden’s combination of parental leave, affordable child care, and universal pre-school helped improve fertility for a period. Analysts in the article also point to work-life balance, gender roles, and trust in the future as important factors. In Hungary, one couple’s case shows the personal risk behind the policy: if their expected child does not arrive, they may have to repay their loan with penalty interest.